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The aftermath of the global financial crisis marked another stress test for 
welfare states and varieties of capitalism. More than ever before, governments 
were forced to consider substantial reforms to welfare provision and enact flexi-
bility-enhancing measures in order to improve financial solvency and economic 
performance. The crash, however, was not only a regionally uneven process in its 
origins but also led to makeshift or uneven policy responses. As a result, the socio-
economic effects of the downturn and political reactions to it varied considerably 
among countries. Nevertheless, there have been some common trends in outcome 
measures. These have served to blur the dividing lines between different welfare 
states and production systems, so vividly captured in the mainstream political 
economy literature.
Keywords: worlds of welfare, varieties of capitalism, crisis, recovery, outcomes, 
divergence, convergence
1. Introduction
One of the most enduring areas of research in political economy has revolved 
around the clustering of developed countries into distinct political and economic 
systems. Commonly referred to as the ‘worlds of welfare’ and ‘varieties of capitalism’ 
approaches, these categorizations are based on the assumption that countries can 
be defined by the types and combinations of policies, institutions and ideologies 
they employ. The worlds of welfare approach focuses mainly on differences in 
the structures of welfare states by examining their extent of decommodification, 
social stratification and the roles of the state, market and family in defining and 
responding to social needs. The varieties of capitalism approach emphasizes how 
diverse systems of production offer different types of comparative advantages, 
which help sustain divergent models of capitalism. Both typologies, therefore, 
not only assume that developed countries can be categorized into different types 
of welfare regimes and production systems, but that each welfare or production 
model follows a qualitatively different development trajectory, producing different 
types and degrees of outcomes as compared to other models, even in times of 
economic crisis.
This chapter seeks to test divergent theories of welfare development and variet-
ies of capitalism by examining the extent to which different types of welfare states 
and production regimes exhibit markedly different socio-economic outcomes in 
the face of external pressures. We seek to raise a series of questions about divergent 
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theories of national development within the context of crisis management and 
recovery. According to the literature, distinct welfare arrangements and production 
systems should produce qualitatively different outcomes, even in times of crisis, but 
is there enough empirical evidence to support such claims? It is also postulated that 
countries categorized under the same type of welfare and production model should 
display similar outcomes, but can we expect to find any national outliers within 
any of the distinct regime-clusters? Moreover, were some welfare states and market 
economies better able to return to their pre-crisis levels more than others? Or did all 
countries move in a broadly similar direction and experience a general worsening of 
outcomes in the post-crisis period?
To answer these questions, we begin the following section with a discussion of 
path dependent development and continuity in national distinctiveness. These con-
cepts correspond with two main arguments found in the literature about divergence 
in national models of welfare and capitalism. Next, the two path-dependent argu-
ments that distinguish between different welfare production systems are described 
in some detail. This is a followed by a brief discussion of the theory of convergence, 
which stands in contrast to theories emphasizing national diversity. We then discuss 
the sample of countries, socio-economic indicators and time period included in our 
datasets. In what follows, we summarize and analyze cross-national data on nine 
indicators. Finally, we end with some concluding remarks about cross-national 
divergence and convergence in socio-economic outcomes and whether the type of 
welfare production regime various countries had made much of a difference in the 
way their economies performed during the recent crisis.
2. Path dependence
The literature on path dependency emphasizes multiple pathways of national 
development, the persistence of institutional arrangements and continuity. In 
simple terms, path dependence means as time progresses meaningful change 
becomes more difficult to implement. In the political science literature, path 
dependence is used to refer to political trajectories that are resistant to change due 
to the self-enforcing nature of institutions [1]. In comparative political economy, 
path dependence is usually a reference to the persistence (inertia) of historically 
entrenched institutions, or the idea that variations in the size, structure and 
outcomes of welfare regimes are a consequence of the individual paths each one fol-
lows. In such a context, welfare states are viewed as diverse and resistant to change. 
Their development trajectories have become ‘locked-in’ over time making shifts 
away from them difficult, even in the face of common external pressures, which 
others view as driving all countries toward the same practices and outcomes. This 
has led to a debate over whether welfare and production systems are converging 
toward a similar model due to common pressures, or whether the path-dependent 
nature of institutional development continues to exist and reinforce the diversity 
of national trajectories. In general, support for the latter argument can be found in 
comparative studies based on typologies of the welfare state and market economy, 
which are reviewed below.
3. Worlds of welfare
Esping-Andersen’s three worlds of welfare capitalism model is perhaps the 
most famous typology of welfare states [2]. For many years, comparative welfare 
scholarship has used his typology to categorize the welfare state according to three 
3The Political Economy of Crisis Recovery
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.92586
dimensions: decommodification (or the extent to which market dependency is 
reduced through state entitlements), the modes of social stratification (the idea that 
regime types manifest variable degrees of inequality) and the relationship between 
the state, market and/or family in the production and management of social well-
being (a balance that typically varies across countries). This classification scheme 
is supposed to allow us to identify dimensions of variation within welfare regimes, 
dimensions that are explicit and narrow enough to be operationalized in an assess-
ment of three ideal welfare cases—the typical liberal, conservative-corporatist and 
social democratic welfare regime-types.
The liberal welfare state provides a minimum level of social protections for its 
citizens. This is done in order to maximize market forces. Liberal regimes empha-
size personal responsibility in welfare provision and deservingness for market 
relief. As a result, benefits are set low, social assistance is means-tested, and wage 
bargaining systems are decentralized so that the private sector can expand to its 
full potential. Liberal regimes try to ensure all who can work do so and obtain their 
income through participation in the free market. Social policy is therefore aimed 
at maximizing the market and individual independence. In such a model, a system 
of administrative surveillance monitors and enforces eligibility determinations 
for social assistance. Consequently, less than those who are eligible for relief end 
up receiving benefits. In general, liberal welfare states are said to have lower levels 
of public sector employment, direct job creation, social protection expenditures, 
long-term unemployment, union density and collective bargaining and higher 
levels of involuntary part-time work, marginally attached workers and short-term 
job tenure. The United States is considered the prototypical example of the liberal 
welfare regime [3].
The conservative-corporatist welfare regime is based on two different kinds of 
fragmentation in the provision of welfare. The first one entitles narrowly defined 
groups with their own specific benefits, with occupational and employment status 
playing an important role in the type or level of services provided. The second one 
provides welfare provision according to a perceived need for assistance using a 
measurable criterion. In general, traditional families are the main targets of welfare 
services, as social policy rewards breadwinners, and provides greater benefits to 
larger families. In this way, the conservative-corporatist welfare state promotes and 
sustains the position of the traditional family in society. Both types of fragmenta-
tion (occupation/employment and family) aim to preserve existing social structures 
and hierarchies. In this way, social benefits are not universal (equal for all), they 
tend to depend on past employment contributions, and financing is made possible 
through employer-employee payroll taxes rather than general tax revenues. Market 
forces are constrained to the extent that firms consider the interests of different 
shareholders in their business calculations. This helps maintain the ‘social market’ 
(diverse stakeholder economy). Conservative-corporatist welfare regimes gener-
ally feature medium levels of public sector employment, direct job creation, social 
protection expenditures, long term unemployment, union density and collective 
bargaining and lower levels of involuntary part-time work, marginally attached 
workers and short-term job tenure [3]. Germany is considered a primary example of 
the conservatist-corporatist welfare regime.
The social democratic welfare state tends to provide entitlements that are 
more universal in scope, egalitarian in their distributive goals and generous in 
their benefit levels. In this regime type, social rights provide high levels of decom-
modification and defamilialization in order to sustain social solidarity rather than 
reinforce hierarchical divisions or market forces. As the ideal welfare model, it 
supports the individual and family over the life course in order to make it easier for 
people to transition between life roles while dealing with challenges associated with 
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work and/or parenthood. Such welfare states provide a range of cradle-to-grave 
protections for their citizens, including such things as child allowances, early child-
hood education, training policies, job protection, paid maternity leave, day care for 
preschoolers, wage replacement benefits, retirement pensions and home care for 
seniors. Social expenditures are typically financed through higher rates of taxation, 
with redistribution of additional income achieved via wealth taxation. Social demo-
cratic welfare states are said to have the highest levels of public employment, direct 
job creation, social protection expenditures, long-term unemployment (due to 
generous benefits), union density and collective bargaining and the lowest levels of 
involuntary part-time work, marginally attached work and short-term job tenure. 
Sweden is viewed as the main example of a social democratic welfare regime [3].
The southern European welfare regime was added to the three-fold typology 
above due to some developed countries exhibiting characteristics that distinguished 
them from other regime types [4, 5]. The distinctive regime properties of the south-
ern welfare state include familism, strong kindship networks, Catholicism, agri-
cultural production and a fragmented system of welfare provision. Generally, the 
southern welfare state is said to have medium or lower levels of public employment, 
direct job creation, social protection expenditures, long-term unemployment, 
involuntary part-time work, marginally attached work, short job tenure, union 
density and collective bargaining. Spain is conventionally regarded as an example of 
the southern European welfare regime [3].
Significant debate has occurred over the extent to which countries actually fit 
into one of the ideal typical welfare regime models. Supporters of the typology 
view it as a valid and reliable methodological approach for categorizing mature 
welfare states and explaining cross-national similarities and differences between 
them. Others are much more skeptical. They criticize the typology [6] for its alleged 
inexhaustiveness (may be more than three or four ideal types), inexclusiveness 
(more anomalous cases than admitted), methodological soundness (wrong criteria 
and unsuitable operationalizations, variables and methods), lack of explanatory 
power [7] and usefulness in comparative analysis [8]. More sympathetic critics, 
however, admit significant differences in national political contexts exist among 
countries, particularly variations in institutional configurations, societal cleavage 
patterns, pressure of socio-economic forces, actor-constellations and degree of 
dependence on the state, market and family. These recognitions are generally based 
on contributions that delineate differences in government expenditures, ideological 
orientations, institutions, and formal policy elements [9, 10]. The issue is that these 
aspects of welfare development fail to capture the outcomes of policies and insti-
tutions in practice. It is therefore important to take into account socio-economic 
effects in order to show how people fare under different welfare regimes and where 
regimes-types diverge and overlap in terms of real-life impacts [11]. While difficul-
ties certain exist in making causal connections between different welfare arrange-
ments and social outcomes, an outcome-centred approach nevertheless offers a 
unique vantage point to examine similarities and differences both between and 
within welfare regimes, which policy-focused and state-centred research has so far 
failed to adequately capture [12].
This is not to deny, of course, there may be a deep and important connection 
between policy, institutions and socio-economic outcomes. For instance, it may be 
that variations in social policy and levels of expenditure and the way institutional 
arrangements have developed in different countries are directly correlated with 
noticeable differences in their welfare outcomes and that countries, with highly 
diverse and unique configurations of capitalist political-economic institutions, 
cluster around a range of redistributive effects. In this way, variations in the socio-
economic outcomes observed, then, should be explainable with reference to the 
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characteristics of the regime type in question. Moreover, countries associated with 
a particular regime-type should all exhibit similar outcomes and follow similar 
development paths.
Still, the question of whether and to what extent measures of socio-economic 
outcomes between different countries vary significantly with the regime-type 
has been relatively under researched in the literature. The little research that does 
exist has tended to focus on the micro level, the pre-crisis period and few cases and 
indicators. What is needed is an empirical assessment of outcomes across a large 
number of country cases during a period of external shock like the 2007–2008 
crisis, which put intense pressure on public budgets, forcing many countries to 
restructure their welfare states [13, 14].
External and internal pressures do not necessarily determine the trajectories of 
welfare states, neither do they dictate their capacities to achieve desired goals in a 
uniform way. But they can restrict the possibilities and choices welfare states have 
at their disposal. Such modifying pressures toward conformity can include demo-
graphic changes, changing household and family patterns, the growth of non-stan-
dard employment arrangements, structural unemployment, technological changes, 
international competition, mobility of capital, international trade, participation in 
a common currency, globalization and economic crises [15]. These pressures can 
come in different forms and welfare states may react to them differently. But exactly 
how they affect the socio-economic outcomes of different welfare regimes remains 
an under-researched area.
Arguably, periods of economic crisis impose challenges and constraints that are 
somewhat different and perhaps more important than some of the other pressures 
on the welfare state. However, economic crises also tend to affect countries differ-
ently because of the diverse political-economic capacities and varied vulnerabilities 
of welfare regimes to such external shocks. Certainly, the global financial crisis of 
2007 marked a ‘stress test’ for many welfare states [16] as more than ever before 
policymakers were forced to consider cuts in welfare provision and enact flexibility-
enhancing measures in order to improve financial solvency and economic perfor-
mance [17]. Adding to this challenge was the fact that the recent financial crisis, 
much like the recession of the early 1990s, occurred when many countries were 
already suffering from an economic downturn [13, 14].
Given the significant pressures the recent crisis placed on many welfare states, 
it is worth examining whether the boundaries between them have been fundamen-
tally redrawn. For instance, did the crisis produce similar socio-economic outcomes 
in different regime types? Or, have there been notable and systematic differences 
in outcomes and patterns of continuity across welfare models in the years follow-
ing the worst moments of the crisis? To what extent do the levels and distribution 
of welfare, as measured by certain outcomes, separate countries from each other? 
Countries within a regime cluster should not only be different enough as a regime-
type to distinguish them from other countries, but also have outcomes in common. 
In this sense, within-regime coherence is just as important as between-regime 
differences [18].
4. Varieties of capitalism
Similar to the typology of welfare states, the varieties of capitalism framework 
popularized by Hall and Soskice [19] highlights systematic differences in the 
structural characteristics of countries. However, unlike welfare regime theory, it 
uses market and strategic coordination to differentiate national systems. According 
to the varieties of capitalism theory, domestic business coordinating capacity is a 
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crucial factor in understanding the divergent structures, strategies and outcomes 
of countries. Configurations of national institutions are supposed to function in a 
complementary manner in order to produce different comparative advantages in 
innovation and production systems at the national level. As such, the business firm 
is placed at the center of the varieties framework, with actors formulating their 
decisions within the framework of institutions such as corporate governance systems, 
training regimes, wage setting and employee representation, labor legislation and 
the character and level of coordination between firms. These firms are connected to 
specific institutional arrangements. They have discretionary powers to make different 
decisions, but they tend to do so in ways that complement specific production 
models and competitive advantages. The concept of institutional complementarity is 
essential to the varieties approach. Complementarity is present when the existence or 
efficiency of one institution increases the returns from another [19].
The varieties approach is based on a comparison between two ideal types of 
capitalism—the liberal market economy and the coordinated market economy. 
In a liberal production regime, market-based mechanisms are maximized, with 
firms competing and coordinating according to supply and demand factors shaped 
by exchange rates of products and market actors. In a coordinated regime, non-
market-based relations play an important role, as firms engage with each other in 
more collaborative ways, achieving coordination via partner networks and other 
institutionalized arrangements. Liberal economies are defined by an outsider corporate 
governance system, which promote general skills whereas coordinated economies are 
framed by an insider system of corporate finance, instead favoring vocational training 
programs and specific skills for long-term employment relationships. The varieties 
framework complements welfare-regime explanations insofar as liberal market 
economies and liberal welfare states overlap, while coordinated economies can be 
embedded within social democratic and conservative welfare regimes [20].
A third type of production system, the Mediterranean economy, is presented 
as a hybrid between the market and coordinated varieties of capitalism. It is 
characterized by specific kinds of non-market coordination in the area of corporate 
finance and more liberalized labor relations. Mediterranean economies are said 
to have a large agrarian sector and more extensive forms of state intervention in 
the economy. They sometimes have greater employment protections but lower 
decommodification rates and low product market competition with less short-term 
pressures for profits because of their centralized financial systems that can devalue 
national currencies. They also tend to have more limited qualifications that curb a 
high skill and wage strategy. The Mediterranean economy is said to overlap with the 
southern European welfare state [19].
Institutional divergence is emphasized in the varieties framework because of 
the recognition that there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach to capitalism. Different 
institutional configurations, themselves products of political development, culture 
and historical processes, support different production, market and investment 
strategies, resulting in different types of comparative advantages. Another impor-
tant element in the varieties school is the recognition that firms make discretionary 
choices that are shaped by national institutional factors, which in turn influence, 
constrain and support those decisions. The varieties approach is therefore mainly 
concerned with the ways in which different types of economies co-exist, given their 
respective strengths and weaknesses in specific areas.
The varieties approach has been widely debated. It has been criticized for being 
too parsimonious for identifying only two types of economies or exaggerating 
the differences between them. Others claim it faces problems explaining changes 
over time [21, 22]. There could be important processes common to both types of 
production regimes, which the varieties perspective not only fails to explain but 
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also directs attention away from [23]. For example, it has been suggested that the 
varieties school cannot adequately account for economic restructuring processes 
as well as it can describe the institutional sources of comparative advantage [24]. 
Research has shown, for example, how different institutional arrangements have 
increasingly morphed into liberal governance systems in order to adapt to short 
term investor interests [25]. Other research suggests, however, that while internal 
and external pressures have not yet channeled different institutional configurations 
into a single converging and parallel model, there have been similar patterns of 
policy adoption across countries such as the transition from income provision to the 
promotion of market participation [26].
The global financial crisis has raised new questions about the persistence of 
cross-national differences identified by the varieties perspective. Sympathetic 
critics claim that convergence toward neoliberal and austerity policies in North 
America and Europe has diminished the differences within varieties of capitalism, 
but that path dependent development has nevertheless given way to divergent 
trends [27]. From this perspective, typical varieties of capitalism can change in 
degree ‘from within’, without necessarily transforming to another type of produc-
tion system [28]. However, very little research has been conducted to assess the 
outcomes of different market systems over the crisis period as compared to institu-
tional and policy trends [29]. This relatively neglected area can be used to uncover 
evidence of convergent or divergent trends between different production regimes.
The varieties approach has been used with some success to explain the empirical 
pattern of continuity and change in outcomes in different types of economies [30]. 
Scholars have used the typology to identify the micro processes of the relationship 
between institutional structures and certain policy outcomes. For example, one 
study sought to explain why trade union density and collective bargaining coverage 
have decreased in mainly liberal market economies but not so much in coordinated 
market economies [31]. Others have used the approach to make empirical claims 
about trends in labor market policies and outcomes such as employment protection, 
unemployment compensation and wages [32].
Most of the research in this area, however, has focused on a few socio-economic 
indicators, a minimum number of country cases, and the period before economic 
stagnation combined with recession put intense pressure on public budgets and 
increased the likelihood of negative labor market effects. More research is therefore 
needed to determine whether the labor market performance of the three archetypal 
forms of distinct capitalist systems conform to the expectations of the varieties of 
capitalism paradigm.
5. Convergence
Welfare states and varieties of capitalism are depicted as being more or less 
resilient to internal and external pressures. A number of studies have tried to show, 
for example, how the core institutional and policymaking characteristics of differ-
ent welfare and production systems have remained firmly in place since the 1980s, 
even in the face of common pressures [33]. However, another body of comparative 
research has argued the opposite that different countries not only experience the 
same pressures but also in ways that lead them to converge toward a single organi-
zational structure or pattern of output. The convergence theory holds that socio-
political and structural changes, including globalization and economic crises [15] 
are homogenizing pressures that push all countries toward the same institutional 
logics, policies and/or outcomes. In this way, convergence is a process whereby 
differences between countries become less discernible over time.
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However, previous studies have paid more attention to institutions, policies and 
the ideas influencing policy-making than to socio-economic outcomes [34]. A more 
up-to-date and comprehensive study is therefore needed to determine the extent of 
convergence in the post-crisis period.
6. Country cases, indicators, time period, limitations and measurements
In what follows, we compare the outcomes of different welfare and produc-
tion regime-types. The list of developed countries in the sample is grouped into 
four different types of welfare regimes and three different types of varieties of 
capitalism. Australia, Canada, Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United States 
are examples of the liberal welfare state and liberal market economy (LWS-LME). 
Austria, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands are examples of the conserva-
tive-corporatist welfare state and coordinated market economy (CWS-CME). 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden are examples of the social democratic welfare state 
and coordinated market economy (SDWS-CME). And Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain serve as examples of the southern welfare state and Mediterranean economy 
(SWS-ME) [2, 19].
We use the following nine indicators from the OECD database in order to 
compare the outcomes of 16 countries (clustered into four regime-types) before and 
after the recent crisis: public sector employment (employees in general government 
as a percentage of total employment), direct job creation (temporary work, and in 
some cases, regular jobs in the public or non-profit sector, offered to unemployed 
individuals), social protection expenditures (as a percentage of total expenditures), 
long term unemployment (share of unemployed as a percentage of the unemployed 
population), involuntary part time work (share of involuntary part-timers as a per-
centage of part-time employment, in dependent employment), marginally attached 
workers (those aged 15 and over, neither employed nor actively searching for work, 
but are willing to take up a job, as share of labor force), short-term job tenure (per-
centage of employees working for their employers for less than 1 year), trade union 
density (the ratio of wage and salary earners who are union members, divided by the 
total number of wage and salary earners) and collective bargaining coverage (number 
of employees covered by the collective agreement, divided by the total number of 
wage and salary earners) [35].
These nine indicators [36–44] were chosen for a variety of reasons. First, 
they were readily available for two points in time—one pre-crisis (2007) and one 
post-crisis (2017–2018)—for all the selected countries. Second, they are decent 
measures of socio-economic outcomes as they encompass a range of factors integral 
to macro-economic stability and social well-being. Third, they are easily accessible 
to a very broad audience. Fourth, they are measured regularly by the OECD, so they 
can be periodically updated to show further divergent or convergent trends beyond 
the most recent year for which data was available. Fifth, the choice of indicators was 
guided by an interest in processes connected to marginalization and social exclu-
sion, given the type of welfare regime and variety of capitalism is supposed to be 
consequential for determining the relative inclusion and exclusion of certain groups 
in society. While some indicators do not capture the socio-economic position of 
large numbers of people, they are nevertheless important measures of social cohe-
sion, which is an important social policy goal in all welfare and production regimes.
Making cross-country comparisons, however, is complicated by the differential 
impacts of the global financial and public debt crises. They did not affect all 
countries to the same extent and policy reactions and recovery processes have been 
very much unequal. In part, this is because of significant variations in financial 
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and trade linkages and the practices and quality of other institutional factors such 
as exchange rate regimes and capital controls. The debt crises, for example, were 
prevalent in European countries, especially the Mediterranean region. Different 
regulatory settings, economic conditions, demographics and political factors 
all help determine both the level of vulnerability of welfare regimes and market 
economies to external shocks and the nature, direction and robustness of policy 
responses. This is one of the reasons why it is difficult to provide a single start date 
for the crisis or attribute crisis mitigation and recovery processes to the designs and 
capacities of specific types of welfare states and production models. Care should 
therefore be taken before generalizing across cases.
The pre- and post-crisis periods can be used as a test case to compare the socio-
economic outcomes of different welfare production systems. For this purpose, 
several indicators can be utilized to shed light on the extent of cross-national 
outcome convergence and divergence, which can be measured by comparing the: 
overall direction of change in the indicators (e.g., numeric outcomes improved 
or deteriorated), numerical values of the indicators (e.g., values very similar or 
different to each other), percent changes from one period to another, average 
country group scores, and average country group percent changes from one period 
to another (Table 1).
Public sector employment decreased in 12 out of 15 countries. The share of 
employment in general government ranged between 10.49 and 28.83% in 2017. In 
line with divergent expectations, the SDWS-CMEs had the highest rates of public 
employment (averaging 27.05%), although they all experienced a small decline. 
Perhaps more surprisingly, the LWS-LMEs, CWS-CMEs and SWS-MEs all had simi-
lar rates and group averages, making them somewhat indistinguishable. However, 
there were small differences in the rates of the CWS-CMEs.
Direct job creation for the unemployed increased in seven countries, decreased 
in five countries and remained the same in three countries. Percent change increases 
ranged from 5.26 to 4100%. Percent change decreases ranged between 6.12 and 
100%. While more countries had created public jobs for their vulnerable members 
since 2007, the 16 country group average in 2017 had declined by a change of 1.48%. 
Unexpectedly, the group average of the CWS-CMEs had decreased by a change 
of 52.71% while the group average of the SWS-MEs had increased by a change of 
241.54%. Within-regime differences in rates were quite common.
Social protection expenditures increased in 10 out of 15 countries. Percent 
change increases ranged from 2.72 to 66.76%. The group averages of all regime-
types except the LWS-LMEs increased in 2017. Contrary to expectations, the group 
averages of the SDWS-CMEs and LWS-LMEs were very similar in 2017 (36.06 and 
33.56%), despite these two regime-types representing opposite ends of the social 
expenditure spectrum in the worlds of welfare literature. Within-regime percent-
ages were very similar among the LWS-LMEs and SDWS-CMEs, with most of them 
in the early to mid-30% range. However, the rates among the CWS-CMEs varied 
considerably (ranging from 16.66 to 46.14%). Similarly, the CWS-MEs all had very 
different rates (2.92, 8.37, 16.05 and 22.36%) (Table 2).
The share of individuals out of work for 1 year or more increased in 12 out 
of 16 countries. Percent change increases ranged between 2.54 and 104.41%. In 
2018, the LWS-LMEs and SDWS-CMEs experienced an increase in their long-term 
unemployment rates and both regimes had very similar group averages (21.98 and 
19.5%). While most CWS-CMEs saw their rates decrease in the post-crisis period, 
their group average (39.25%) was higher than that of the LWS-LMEs and SDWS-
CMEs. There were significant within-regime differences in terms of rates among the 
LWS-LMEs, CWS-CMEs and SWS-MEs, showing once again divergent theories fail 
to account for dissimilar outcomes within particular regime-clusters.
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The share of involuntary part-timers increased in 7 out of 13 countries. Percent 
change increases ranged from 19.75 to 157.41%. Consistent with divergent theories, 
the LWS-LMEs and SWS-MEs had some of the highest rates (23.07 and 64.42%), 
while the CWS-CMEs and SDWS-CMEs had the lowest (8.48 and 11.25%). The 
sample group average increased by a change of almost 20%.
The share of marginally attached workers decreased in eight countries, 
increased in six countries and remained the same in two countries. Country group 
averages were nearly indistinguishable in 2018, blurring the dividing lines between 
countries. There were notable differences among the LWS-LMEs, CWS-CMEs and 
SDWS-CMEs, particularly Australia, the Netherlands and Finland whose rates were 
more than twice that of their group members (Table 3).
The share of employees with less than 1 year job tenure decreased in nine coun-















Liberal Welfare State & Liberal Market Economy (LWS-LME)
Australia N/A N/A 0.55 0.12 34.11 32.18
Canada 19.13 19.38 0.01 0.01 N/A N/A
Ireland 14.61 14.86 1.02 1.24 37.61 35.19
UK 19.2 16.01 0.0 0.01 (2011) 33.81 34.73
US 15.89 (2008) 15.15 0.01 0 29.15 32.13
Averages 17.21 16.35 0.318 0.276 33.67 33.56
Conservative Welfare State & Coordinated Market Economy (CWS-CME)
Austria 16.92 16.82 0.19 0.20 29.76 31.35
Belgium 18.47 18.20 0.49 0.46 9.99 16.66
Germany 11.33 10.49 0.83 0.21 49.23 46.14
Netherlands 12.81 11.95 0.41 0.04 22.50 23.74
Averages 14.88 14.36 0.48 0.227 27.87 29.47
Social Democratic Welfare State & Coordinated Market Economy (SDWS-CME)
Denmark 28.33 28.02 0.0 0.0 35.09 36.39
Finland 24.59 24.29 0.56 1.09 26.75 32.53
Sweden 30.26 28.83 0.0 0.0 41.06 39.26
Averages 27.73 27.05 0.56 1.09 34.30 36.06
Southern Welfare State & Mediterranean Economy (SWS-ME)
Greece 17.99 17.70 0.01 0.42 7.48 2.92
Italy 14.50 13.43 0.01 0.05 (2015) 16.49 22.36
Portugal 14.49 14.38 0.0 0.0 12.66 16.05
Spain 13.36 15.30 0.24 
(2011)
0.42 6.86 8.37
Averages 15.05 15.20 0.065 0.222 10.87 12.42
16 Country 
Averages
18.12 17.6 0.271 0.267 26.17 27.33
Table 1. 
Public sector employment (PSE), direct job creation (DJC) and social protection expenditures (SPE) in worlds 
of welfare and varieties of capitalism.
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22.43%. Percent change increases were from 0.92 to 89.42%. Short-term job tenure 
rates were similar in the LWS-LMEs and SDWS-CMEs (close to 20% points), contrary 
to expectations. In the literature, the prevalence of flexible employment is said to be 
greater in the liberal economies. While short-term job tenure decreased in most places, 
at least 11 countries from four different regimes had rates between 16 and 22%, mean-
ing nearly one-fifth of all their employees were working for their employers for less 
than 12 months. These similar rates make the regime-clusters indistinguishable as well. 
There were also within-regime differences among the CWS-CMEs and SWS-MEs.
Trade union density decreased in 15 out of 16 countries. In eight countries, 
there were percent change decreases ranging between 15 and 30%. Consistent 
with expectations, the LWS-LMEs and SWS-MEs had the lowest union density 
figures, with the CWS-CMEs and SDWS-CMEs coming in second and third place 
respectively. There were considerable outliers in all the regime-types except the 













Liberal Welfare State & Liberal Market Economy (LWS-LME)
Australia 18.5 19.4 23.8 28.5 7.1 5.5
Canada 7.0 10.1 N/A N/A 2.1 1.9
Ireland 30.0 40.8 10.8 27.8 (2017) 0.8 (2008) 3.5
UK 23.8 26.3 9.7 12.9 2.3 (2008) 1.2
US 10.0 13.3 N/A N/A 0.9 0.9
Averages 17.86 21.98 14.77 23.07 2.64 2.60
Conservative Welfare State & Coordinated Market Economy (CWS-CME)
Austria 27.2 28.9 13.0 10.6 3.8 2.5
Belgium 50.4 48.7 15.2 6.8 1.4 1.7
Germany 56.6 41.4 21.6 9.9 1.6 1.3
Netherlands 39.4 38.0 4.6 6.6 3.2 3.0
Averages 43.40 39.25 13.60 8.48 2.50 2.12
Social Democratic Welfare State & Coordinated Market Economy (SDWS-CME)
Denmark 16.1 20.2 13.1 13.1 1.9 1.2
Finland 23.0 22.8 N/A N/A 3.3 4.6
Sweden 12.8 15.5 13.1 9.4 2.1 1.7
Averages 17.30 19.5 13.10 11.25 2.43 2.50
Southern Welfare State & Mediterranean Economy (SWS-ME)
Greece 49.7 70.3 61.6 78.6 0.9 2.4
Italy 47.5 59.0 40.8 66.3 3.3 (2010) 3.6
Portugal 47.2 48.4 54.7 53.5 (2017) 1.3 2.5
Spain 20.4 41.7 37.5 59.3 3.6 3.6
Averages 41.20 54.85 48.65 64.42 2.27 3.02
16 Country
Averages
29.97 34.05 24.58 29.48 2.47 2.57
Table 2. 
Long-term unemployment (LTU), involuntary part-time workers (IPTW) and marginally attached workers 
(MAW) in worlds of welfare and varieties of capitalism.
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Collective bargaining coverage decreased in eight countries, increased in five 
countries and remained the same in three countries. Group averages in 2017 were 
consistent with assumptions in the literature, although the SDWS-CMEs, CWS-CMEs 
and SWS-MEs had very similar averages in 2007. Within-regime differences were 
notable in all the regime-types except the SDWS-CMEs whose rates were similar.
7. Conclusion
Overall, there was unidirectional convergence toward negative outcomes in many 
countries in the post-crisis period. Many countries have not returned to their pre-
crisis levels as several indicators show, including public sector employment (12 out 















Liberal Welfare State & Liberal Market Economy (LWS-LME)
Australia 24.7 20.9 
(2017)
18.8 13.7 54.9 60.0 (2016)
Canada 22.8 20.6 27.3 25.9 29.4 28.1
Ireland 20.0 19.4 30.5 24.1 40.5 (2009) 32.5 (2014)
UK 18.5 16.7 28.0 23.4 34.6 26.0
US N/A N/A 11.6 10.1 12.7 11.60
Averages 21.50 19.40 23.24 19.44 34.42 31.64
Conservative Welfare State & Coordinated Market Economy (CWS-CME)
Austria 16.5 17.0 30.4 26.3 98.0 (2008) 98.0
Belgium 13.9 12.4 54.7 50.3 96.0 96.0
Germany 15.6 14.8 19.8 16.5 61.7 56.0 (2016)
Netherlands 10.4 19.7 20.2 16.4 79.1 77.6
Averages 14.1 15.97 31.27 27.37 83.70 81.90
Social Democratic Welfare State & Coordinated Market Economy (SDWS-CME)
Denmark 27.2 21.1 69.0 66.5 76.8 82.0 (2016)
Finland 21.8 22.8 70.6 60.3 84.7 (2008) 89.3 (2015)
Sweden 21.6 21.8 70.8 64.9 89.5 90.0 (2016)
Averages 23.53 21.90 70.13 63.90 83.66 87.10
Southern Welfare State & Mediterranean Economy (SWS-ME)
Greece 10.8 13.6 22.6 20.2 (2016) 100.0 25.5 (2016)
Italy 12.7 12.2 33.5 34.5 80.0 (2010) 80.0 (2016)
Portugal 14.5 16.6 20.7 (2008) 15.3 (2016) 86.0 73.9 (2016)
Spain 24.3 19.8 16.3 13.6 82.9 83.6 (2016)
Averages 15.57 15.50 23.27 20.90 87.22 65.75
16 Country 
Averages
18.35 17.96 34.05 30.12 69.17 63.13
Table 3. 
Short-term job tenure (STJT), trade union density (TUD) and collective bargaining coverage (CBC) in worlds 
of welfare and varieties of capitalism.
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countries), social protection expenditures (decreased in 5 out of 15 countries), long-
term unemployment (increased in 12 out of 16 countries), involuntary part-time work 
(increased in 7 out of 13 countries), marginally attached workers (increased in 6 out of 
16 countries), short-term job tenure (increased in 6 out of 15 countries), union density 
(decreased in 15 out of 16 countries) and collective bargaining coverage (decreased in 
8 out of 16 countries). Different welfare production systems were therefore not always 
distinguishable in terms of their impact on the overall direction of change, as many 
countries were worse off on almost every indicator after the crisis than before it, or 
the degree of change from 1 year to another, as some of the greatest negative percent 
changes were reported among the least expected regime-types such as the SDWS-
CMEs. It also seems less plausible that the type of welfare or production regime makes 
as much difference in shaping the value of outcomes as some of the literature seems to 
suggest. This can be seen in very similar group averages for indicators such as public 
sector employment (with three regime averages ranging between 14 and 16%), social 
protection expenditures (with two opposite regimes exhibiting averages between 
33 and 36%), long-term unemployment (two regimes had averages between 19 and 
21%), marginally attached workers (all four regimes had averages between 2 and 3%), 
short-term job tenure (two regimes had averages between 19 and 21% and two regimes 
had 15% averages) and trade union density (two regimes had averages between 19 
and 20%). Furthermore, individual countries belonging to the same regime cluster 
sometimes shared very little in common with their group members in terms of the 
direction of change and the value of the outcomes.
However, it is not implausible that the type of welfare or production regime makes 
some difference. This is most clearly demonstrated in the data by the way different 
types of welfare and production systems were characterized by different average 
levels of direct job direction, involuntary part-time workers and collective bargaining 
coverage. Overall, however, the empirical evidence seems to call into question between 
regime differences and within regime similarities as postulated by mainstream 
theoretical understandings of welfare states and varieties of capitalism. There appears 
to be more evidence of convergence than divergence in negative outcomes across the 
four regime clusters, as well as lack of evidence to support within-regime coherence.
© 2020 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited. 
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